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A B S T R A C T
This study examines teacher discretion effects in Dutch secondary education for the period 2007–2012. Stark
discontinuities are observed in the exam grade distribution for high-stakes retaking students and are located at
important graduation thresholds. This phenomenon is systematically related to the level of discretion when
grading the exam, with results suggesting that approximately 11% of all graduating retakers did so because of
teacher discretion. This yields unequal graduation opportunities that are the result of school- and subject choice
patterns, since teacher discretion is structurally and selectively exerted at the school-level with the objective to
let students on the margin graduate.
1. Introduction
Standardized tests serve to provide objective measures on student
performance and these can be high stakes for students as they often
determine, at least in part, retention and graduation decisions
(Dee, Dobbie, Jacob, & Rockoff, 2016). These standardized tests also
have become increasingly central to accountability policies with the
objective to evaluate, for example, school and teacher performance. The
main intent of test-based accountability policies is to provide incentives
that maximize student learning, but perverse incentives resulting from
poorly designed accountability policies can have significant, unintended
and undesirable consequences (Jacob, 2005). The existing widespread
concerns over test validity and the manipulation of scores are therefore
not surprising (Dee et al., 2016), yet until recently there has been sur-
prisingly little empirical evidence related to test-based accountability
and how it may induce manipulation of student test scores (Jacob, 2005).
Two recent empirical evaluations performed in the United States
(Dee et al., 2016) and Sweden (Diamond & Persson, 2016) provide
strong evidence that allowing for teacher discretion in grading stan-
dardized exams gives all the more reason for policy makers to be con-
cerned. Dee et al. (2016) examine the causes and consequences of test
score manipulation of high-stakes exit exams for New York State sec-
ondary-school students and find that teachers purposefully moved
students just over predefined performance thresholds when grading
their own students. Moreover, results varied systematically across and
within schools. While black and Hispanic students are more likely to
have a test score near a graduation threshold and are thus more often
exposed to manipulation, they are less likely to have their test scores
manipulated conditional on scoring just below a cutoff. Notably, con-
ditional on scoring near a proficiency cutoff, white and Asian students,
students with better baseline scores, and those with good behavioral
records are more likely to have their scores manipulated due to teacher
discretion. Diamond and Persson (2016) corroborate the existence of
test score manipulation for Swedish compulsory schools, and similarly
identify ‘a bad test day’-effect, suggesting that teachers exploit their
discretion to undo potentially harmful consequences of idiosyncratic
student performance. In contrast to the results in Dee et al. (2016), their
estimates do not suggest that test score manipulation is related to stu-
dent background characteristics. Furthermore, they find relative
homogeneous positive implications for subsequent educational, labor
market and life outcomes, highlighting that potential signaling me-
chanisms resulting from graduation could enhance a student’s academic
motivation and/or teachers’ perception of academic ability.
This study adds to this emerging body of literature on local grading,
teacher discretion and test score manipulation (see, also: Burgess &
Greaves, 2013; Hanna & Linden, 2012; Lavy, 2008) by evaluating scores
on high-stakes standardized exams at the end of secondary education in
the Netherlands. It empirically investigates the existence of teacher
discretion in grading and potential consequences for inequalities of
student graduation opportunities. A specific contribution of this study is
the ability to empirically expose the underlying dynamics of teacher
discretion mechanisms, by exploiting variation in information, stakes
and teacher discretion opportunities, as to validate a per-student utility
model of teacher discretion.
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For this purpose, a unique feature of the Dutch exam system is
exploited in that subject teachers grade two similar standardized exams
of some of their students twice over a short span of time. Yet, these two
attempts differ vastly in terms of the stakes at hand and the information
available, which can impact the validity of the observed student per-
formance measure (Neal, 2013) and the associated teacher grading
practices (McMillan & Nash, 2000). For the empirical evaluations, ad-
ministrative data for the Netherlands is used for the period 2007–2012,
covering 99% of the Dutch secondary school exam population. This
data is augmented with information on the proportion of open ques-
tions on the (retake) exam.1 Since observed performance gains on the
retake exam can potentially be related with teacher discretion, student
ability boosting and mean reversion, we use the proportion of open
questions as an instrument to identify the effect of teacher discretion.
The identifying assumption is that that this measure affects potential
teacher discretion (see also Schuurs, Kuhlemeier, & Gitsels, 2017), as it
determines the degree of freedom a teacher has to manipulate grades,
but not students’ ability boosting and mean reversion mechanisms.
First, this paper evaluates if observed performance gains can be
predicted by variation in exam openness and to what extent students
graduate as a result of teacher discretion. Next, this paper examines
whether teacher discretion raises concerns of educational inequity with
respect to unequal graduation opportunities within schools with respect
to student gender and ethnicity. Finally, the paper explores variation in
the proportion of students who graduate by means of a retake exam
between schools to establish whether there are also potential concerns
of between-school inequity.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2, outlines the Dutch in-
stitutional background and explains the exam and grading system in
detail. Section 3 introduces a so-called graduation game that emerges in
this context based on information and stakes and integrates these insights
in a theoretical model for teacher discretion in (Dutch exam) grading.
Section 4 reports on the data and descriptive statistics. Section 5 shows
the empirical findings, and Section 6 summarizes and provides a dis-
cussion of the results and their potential policy implications.
2. Dutch education context
2.1. Secondary education in the Netherlands
Upon finishing primary education, children in the Netherlands are
tracked into different secondary education levels, with their final track
determined after the first of second year of secondary education (Fig. 1).
The decision to assign students to a particular track at the start of sec-
ondary education is based on both a standardized assessment in taken
grade 8 and the advice of the primary school teacher. Three distinct
tracks in secondary education can be distinguished. Pre-vocational edu-
cation (4 years) prepares students for vocational education and com-
prises 4 separate sub-tracks, secondary general education (5 years) pre-
pares for universities of applied sciences, and pre-university education (6
years) for academic universities. Each track has a matriculation ex-
amination in place, in which students take exams in a variety of subjects.
This study focuses on students from all three tracks enrolled in the final
grade after which they -are expected to- matriculate.
2.2. Secondary school exams and grading system
The school-leaving (matriculation) examination for secondary edu-
cation in the Netherlands consists, for each subject, of a school ex-
amination (SE) and a national written examination (hereafter referred
to as Central Exam, CE) at the end of the final school year. Depending
on the level of education, students take a CE in roughly 6 to 8 different
subjects. The Ministry of Education, Culture and Science prescribes the
topics that must be covered in the SEs of each subject, but schools have
discretion in constructing their own school exams. These school exams
usually comprise two or more tests per subject, and can be oral, prac-
tical or written. The CE for each subject is one test, constructed by the
Ministry of Education, Culture and Science, and takes place at a fixed
date and time at the end of the final year. The grading scale of each
subject is from 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest) and the final grade (grade
point average, GPA) for each subject is the arithmetic average of the
grades achieved on the school and the central examination (i.e.
= +GPA SE CE· ·s ubject s s( ) 12
1
2 ). A GPA of 5.5 is required to pass a parti-
cular subject, but since the school leaving examinations consist of 6 or
more subjects, there are explicit rules determining whether a student
graduates. The specific graduation rules are outlined in Appendix A, but
the main determinant for graduation is whether a student has passed
(nearly) all individual subjects.
The Dutch examination system give students the opportunity to
retake the CE, but for one subject only. This retake takes place within a
week after the first-term results have become known and the highest
score on both attempts is used towards determining whether a student
has met the requirements for graduation. The formula determining
grade point average per subject is then represented by
= +GPA SE CE CE· ·max( , )s ubject s s s( ) 12
1
2 1 2 ). Students who fail to graduate
will not be eligible to enroll in the post-secondary education sector their
track was preparing them for.
Fig. 2 outlines the timing of exam grading activities that are re-
levant for identifying the possible existence of teacher discretion effects
in grading high stakes exams. The figure covers the period from the
moment teachers have registered the SE grades in a secured digital
environment until the moment the grades of the retake exams are
publicly announced. Early in May, teachers upload the SE grades of
their students in WOLF, a (web-based) program to exchange exam-re-
lated files.2 Upon successful uploading, teachers can no longer change
the SE grades registered. At some point mid-May, the CE exams are
administered for all subjects and teachers are provided with explicit
and strict guidelines regarding the grading procedure. A student’s own
subject teacher has two weeks to assign a score to each answer based on
these guidelines and the assigned scores per question are uploaded in
WOLF. Once the scores are uploaded, teachers can no longer change the
assigned scores. The Dutch National Institute for Educational Mea-
surement (CITO) has assigned a teacher from a different school (but
same subject) to check and re-mark the work (the so-called second
corrector). The second corrector also has two weeks to review the an-
swers and registers any deviating scores, after which (s)he is redirected
to a negotiation page. Also for the second corrector it holds that re-
gistered deviations cannot be altered once landed on the negotiation
page. Deviations are shown on the negotiation page and both correctors
then contact each other to reach agreement. Once agreement has been
reached, the second corrector alters the assigned scores and the first
corrector must approve that these revised scores are correctly changed
in WOLF. Upon approval, the assigned scores are final and stored in
WOLF. In practice, these final scores are very close to the initial scores
(i.e. 0.3% lower on average) as uploaded by the first corrector
Kuhlemeier and Kremers (2012).3
Relevant for the possibility to exert teacher discretion is that CITO
1 This information is manually obtained from the exam booklets, as uploaded
to the ministerial website of the Commission for Tests and Exams (https://
www.examenblad.nl/).
2 WOLF is developed by the Dutch National Institute for Educational
Measurement (CITO) charged with all logistics surrounding the national ex-
amination in secondary education.
3 If both correctors cannot reach agreement, school boards from both schools
are asked to mediate in the process. If still no consensus is reached, schools can
inform the Educational Inspectorate, who can decide to appoint a third in-
dependent corrector. In practice, school boards are asked to mediate in only 1%
of the cases and the Educational Inspectorate is asked to intervene in only 0.3%
of the cases Kuhlemeier and Kremers (2013)
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announces the conversion formula required to translate points to an
actual grade only after the final scores of all exam students are stored in
WOLF. This conversion formula contains a subject-specific factor which
varies from year to year as to control for erratic differences in the dif-
ficulty of a CE exam. In practice, depending on the level of this factor,
this can mean a difference in CE grade of (over) 2 points on a scale from 1
to 10. Not knowing this factor thus makes that students and teachers
cannot have an accurate prior expectation about the number of points
required to (just) pass a particular subject. In the conversion formula, this
factor is denoted by N. This N-factor is announced in mid-June, after
which students can determine whether they need a retake exam. If a
retake exam is required, students will take this exam within a week and
the grading procedure will then be similar to the procedure described
above. One pivotal difference, given that the N-factor is known at the
time of grading, is that teachers now know exactly how many points are
needed at the retake exam for the student ‘at risk’ to graduate.
3. The graduation game in the Netherlands
Exams are graded in vastly different contexts in terms of both the
stakes at hand and the information available. To be specific, students
are allowed to retake one exam for one subject which takes place within
a week after the results of the first attempt have become known. A
retake is often observed if the grade point average (GPA) across all
subjects after the first term is insufficient for passing the matriculation
examination. The stakes at the retake are thus even higher than in the
first-term exams when graduation depends solely on the outcome of this
single retake exam. Also, the information to students and teachers be-
tween the first and second term is distinctively different. The Dutch
Testing Agency (CITO) announces the subject-specific conversion for-
mula used to translate achieved exam points into grades only when the
results of the first term are made public. Yet, this same conversion
formula then also applies for the subject retake exam that is still yet to
be administered and graded. As a result, both teachers and students do
not precisely know how many points are needed to pass a particular
subject in the first period attempt, but know exactly how many points
are needed on the second attempt in order to pass the subject and
graduate. We show that when students require a retake exam for gra-
duation, it holds that the optimal strategy of students is to perform as
well as they can, and that grade manipulation by means of teacher
discretion should explicitly reveal itself in the grading of exams taken in
the second term.
Fig. 1. Dutch education system Note: ISCED levels are shown in parenthesis.
Fig. 2. Timeline of Exam Grading Activities Note: CE1 (CE2) refers to the central exam performance in period 1 (2). SE refers to school-based exams. N-factor is the
subject-year-specific term used for converting points to actual grades.
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These different grading environments create a setting we refer to as
the graduation game, illustrated in Fig. 3. Distinguishing between these
different grading contexts gives insights into when teachers are will
exert their discretion in grading an exam as to enable student to -just-
graduate. Fig. 3 depicts four possible situations (A, B, C and D) that
occur throughout the exam period and the corresponding GPA formula
in each situation. This formula represents not only how the GPA of the
student can be calculated, but also what part of that formula is (un)
observed by the teacher when grading. In situation A, teachers do not
observe the N-factor and, therefore, do not observe CE1 and cannot
precisely determine GPA when grading. Moreover, teachers are also
unaware of the GPA for any of the other subjects part of a student’s
school-leaving examination, making it relatively difficult to pinpoint
exactly which students are at risk of not graduating. Yet, in situation B
(i.e. a student has a first attempt for a subject in the second term), the
situation is markedly different. In this case, teachers and students are
aware of the N-factor and of the grades achieved through first attempts
on other subjects in the first term. Relative to situation A, this addi-
tional piece of information enable the subject-teacher in charge of
grading the exam to figure out whether a score does or does not yield
graduation. This situation somewhat resembles the situation of the re-
take exam (i.e. situation C) in terms of the amount of information
available, but the stakes in situation B are lower, because students can
still make use of the retake opportunity4. Situation C represents the
standard retake exam opportunity observed in the second term and, if a
student failed to matriculate on the basis of the first term results, both
the student and the teacher know that graduation depends solely on the
result of this retake exam (i.e. CE2). One could say that this situation is
similar than situation B, but that the urgency (stakes) for exerting
teacher discretion and/or manipulating scores as to benefit students is
higher. Situation D refers to a specific situation in which the N-factor of
the retake exam is adjusted afterwards. Importantly, the N-factor can
only be adjusted upwards, such that the initial N-factor is always a
correct lower bound of the final grade.
3.1. A Model Of teacher discretion in grading
To gain more insight in the workings of teacher discretion in
grading, we integrate the aforementioned graduation game in the
model of test score manipulation by Diamond and Persson (2016). The
formula used to determine the CE-grade can be represented by:5
= +CE S N N S
S
N( , ) (10 )· ,i i i
total (1)
where Stotal represents the maximum number of points that can be
achieved, Si the actual number of points achieved by student i, and N
the N-factor that can take on any value between 0 and 2. The formula
highlights thatCE is determined by both the N-factor and the proportion
of points obtained on the exam. In the absence of teacher discretion in
grading, Eq. (1) can be rewritten as:
= +CE S SE N N S a
S
N( ( , ), ) (10 )· ( , )i i i i i i i
total (2)
The achieved number of points on the CE then depend on student
ability, ai, and an error term, εi, which captures the fact that the per-
formance on the central exam may deviate from the true ability of the
student. As such, students can have a good test day (Si> ai) or a bad
test day (Si< ai), reflecting idiosyncratic performance differences with
respect to a student’s (unobserved) “true” ability (cf. Diamond &
Persson (2016)).
Students will only pass a specific subject if CE SE11 and tea-
chers can use this information to determine whether they exert dis-
cretion in grading (e.g. to ensure a student graduates), thereby
awarding additional points to student i, indicated by Δi (see Eq. (3)).6
When we combine this passing rule with Eq. (2) - and rearrange terms-,
the threshold of total points (i.e. +Si i) required to pass a subject is
Fig. 3. The Graduation Game .
4 Given the incidental nature of situation B, the schedule for this ”period3”
examinations is determined on a post-hoc basis. These additional retake exams
usually take place early August.
5 We note that in reality the formula is = +CE S S N9/( / )i total i . This is a rather
inconvenient formula because the N-factor can take any value between 0 and 2
such that CE may be (lower) higher than the (minimum) maximum CE of (1) 10
points when the student answered all exam question (incorrectly) correctly. The
examination board, which is a ministerial but independent organization that
has the responsibility that the quality and the logistics are guaranteed (see
https://www.cvte.nl/) therefore formulated the so-called border-relationships.
These border-relationships are grade corrections for when the N-factor is un-
equal to 1. Information on the exact standardization of the exams can be found
at http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0010538/1999-07-07. For the developed
model in this section it is important that CE is a continuous monotonic in-
creasing function of Si and N and the alternative presented formula for de-
termining CE is therefore convenient and without loss of generality.
6 This can be easily seen, because the subject-specific = +GPA SE CE· ·12
1
2
and students pass the subject if GPA≥5.50.When we substitute =GPA 5.50
and rearrange terms we obtain the rule that student pass if CE SE11 .
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given by:
+ =S a S SE N
N
( , ) (11 )
10i i i i
total
(3)
The left-hand side of Eq. (3) indicates that the total points obtained
is the sum of points achieved by the student (Si(ai, εi)) and any addi-
tional points awarded by the teacher by means of exerting discretion
(Δi). The right-hand side of Eq. (3) highlights that the required total
points to pass the exam is conditional on the N-factor and the already
registered SE-grade. We refer to this right-hand side asκ, or κ(N), to
illustrate that the teacher knows how many points is required only if the
N-factor is known.
Based on Eq. (3) and threshold κ, we can then define the following
indicator function:
= = +t t a N S a N( , , , ) 1 if ( , ) ( )
0 Otherwise
.i i i i i i i i
(4)
Eq. (4) reflects that student i passes the exam for a certain subject if
the obtained points +S a( , )i i i i surpasses threshold κ(N). A distinct
difference between the model of Diamond and Persson (2016) is that
our model is not a fullinformation model in the sense that teachers do not
have full information regarding the threshold value if the N-factor has
not yet been announced (i.e. situation A). This means that teachers can
only effectively target an artificial increase in CE grade - exerting their
discretion in grading- if the N-factor is known. Eq. (4) also captures that
teachers will only increase the test score of a student with Δ if this will
result in graduation.
Assume that student i is taught by teacher j. When teacher j is
manipulating student i’s test score effectively, Δi is chosen such that the
utility function of each student is maximized:
=
> >
u t SE N c
c c
( ) ( , , , ) ( ),
( ) 0, ( ) 0
ij i ij i i i i ij i
ij i ij i (5)
Parameter βij reflects teacherj’s student-specific desire to raise stu-
dent i’s grade from a fail to a pass, or as Diamond and Persson (2016)
remark βij “... permits the teacher to use her discretion both in a “corrective”
and “discriminatory” fashion” (p.12). This distinction is important, as the
term corrective refers to teachers who may have a preference for
compensating a bad test day, while the term discriminatory refers to
teachers who may have a preference for increasing test scores of stu-
dents with certain (background) characteristics. While βij can vary at
the teacher-lever as a result of these student-specific reasons, it also
encapsulates any incentives to manipulate that may exist for teachers
(e.g. career perspective) and schools (e.g. league tables, accountability)
that are irrespective of student i and are fixed for teacher j. Increasing
the points obtained by a student with Δi comes at a cost (i.e. cij(Δi)) and
these costs are assumed to be strictly increasing and convex. This im-
plies that it becomes increasingly difficult for the teacher to award
additional points by means of exerting discretion, given that (1) exams
only have a limited set of points that are subjective to teacher discre-
tion, (2) additional points would require rewarding answers that are
clearly wrong, and (3) teachers (schools) have to justify their grading
results to the second corrector (educational inspectorate). Teachers thus
optimally exert their discretion up to the point where the marginal
benefits of doing so just offset the marginal costs:
= = >







From the model above, a number of empirical hypotheses are de-
rived. Eq. (6) illustrates that teachers will only engage in the costly
exertion of teacher discretion if (s)he has a positive (student-specific)
desire to do so (βij>0) and when doing so alters the student’s subject
grade from fail to pass. Furthermore, a teacher would not add points
beyond the passing threshold, given that it’s costly to do and does not
further alter the grade in terms of pass or fail status. As such, if teacher
discretion is exerted while grading, this will be targeted effectively and
should emerge as a discontinuity in the test score distribution centered
around the subject-specific pass-fail threshold. Next, given that
knowing exactly the threshold level of points required is contingent on
observing the N-factor (i.e. κ(N)), and given the positive, increasing,
convex cost function of adding points by means of teacher discretion
(cij(Δi)> 0, >c ( ) 0,ij i >c ( ) 0ij i ), test score manipulation will be
particularly observed when information available and stakes at hand
are both high (i.e. retake attempts of high-risk students). Lastly, the
magnitude of points added by the teacher (Δi) is conjectured to be in-
creasing in a teacher’s student-specific desire (βij) to engage in this
behavior and decreasing in the costs associated with it (cij(Δi)); the
latter suggesting that test score manipulation will be more prevalent
when the potential to exert teacher discretion is relatively high.
3.2. Empirical strategy for estimating teacher discretion effects
In evaluating the existence of teacher discretion effects for high-
stakes retakers in Dutch secondary education, we first display the GPA
distributions after the first and second attempt and estimate the size of a
discontinuity at the subject-passing threshold of 55 points using
McCrary density tests. We do this for different levels of exam openness
to see whether the size of such a discontinuity is related to the pro-
portion of open questions. For policy-making it is relevant to get an
estimate for the number of high-risk retaking students that are affected
by teacher discretion and -moreover- how many graduated by means of
teacher discretion.
Thus, in order to estimate teacher discretion effects for high-risk
retaking students, we then first determine the observed performance
gain as =Gain CE2 CE1. Next, we estimate the first-stage discretion-
induced performance using a reduced form OLS:
= + + + + + +XGain POQ µ ,2iklm i i k l m iklm0 1 (7)
where Gainiklmis the observed performance gain on the retake exam for
student i, observed in educational track k, in year l, at school m. POQi is
the proportion of open questions for the retake exam of student i, Xi a
set of student-level characteristics, and we include fixed effects for the
educational track (μk), year (λl) and school (ωm). Note that we do not
observe teacher j. iklm is assumed to be a random error term, but given
that the proportion of open questions varies only per subject-year (e.g.
Pre-university track Mathematics in 2007), standard errors are clus-
tered at the subject-year level. The coefficient of interest is α1 as it
depicts the performance gains that can be predicted by variation in
proportion open questions.
In estimating to what extent discretion-induced performance gains
leads to variation in graduation, a 2SLS procedure is performed in
which observed performance gain is instrumented using the proportion
of open questions (i.e. Eq. (7)). The second stage then is :
= + + + + + +XGrad Gain^ ,2iklm iklm i k l m iklm0 1 (8)
where Gradiklmis the observed graduation status after the retake exam
for student i, observed in educational track k, in year l, at school m. In
this second stage equation, Gain^ iklm is the predicted value from the first
stage and captures the variation in performance gains that is predicted
by the proportion open question questions. Xi is the same set of student-
level characteristics, and in similar fashion as the first stage we include
fixed effects for the educational track (γk), year (δl) and school (θm). The
error term (ϵiklm) is again clustered at the subject-year level. To avoid
the risk of selective sample estimation as a result of potential non-
random missing student characteristics, all students are always in-
cluded in the estimation results, with missing dummy variables for each
characteristic included in the model as to account for any level differ-
ences between students with and without missing observations on a
particular characteristic. The coefficient of interest is β1 as it indicates
the estimate for the discretion-induced graduation effect.
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In the final stage of the analysis -and using the estimate of the α1
coefficient from estimating Eq. (7) we simulate the performance gains
for graduating high-stakes retaking student i that would have occurred
if no teacher discretion was present and then calculate a counterfactual
graduation status for all students, using the final scores thus obtained
and the pass-fail regulations appropriate for that specific cohort (see
Appendix A). By comparing the number of high-stakes retaking students
that actually graduated with the simulated number that would have
occurred if no teacher discretion was present gives us a policy-relevant
indicator for how many students graduated by means of teacher dis-
cretion. To check for potential heterogeneities, we perform the afore-
mentioned estimation strategy for different subgroups of students (i.e.
by gender and ethnicity).
4. Data and descriptive statistics
This study uses student-level administrative data on 1.12 million
students who are in their final secondary school year in the period
2007–2012. The data contains information on students enrolled in
publicly-funded schools, covering 99% of the exam student population.
For each student, a list of background characteristics is known, together
with the results on school examinations and central exams (for all
subjects and both terms). Information about the N-factor was derived
from the ministerial website of the Commission for Tests and Exams
(https://www.examenblad.nl/). The average N-factor in period 1 was
0.95 (SD = 0.45) and the N-term adjustment in the retake was 0.29 (SD
= 0.19).
Table 1 compares student characteristics between the full student
population and the population of students who make use of their retake
opportunity. Among the population of retakers, students who required a
retake in order to graduate are labeled ‘high-stakes’. The average student
is around 16 years old and has achieved a school exam grade of 6.52, on
a 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest) scale. The proportion of students with a
migrant background or living in an impoverished neighborhood is, re-
spectively, 0.20 and 0.13. The proportions related to education- level
show that most students are enrolled in pre-vocational education (55%)
and the least students are enrolled in pre-university education (17%).
Students who used their retake opportunity have, on average, lower
school exam grades, are somewhat older and more frequently have a
migrant background or live in an impoverished neighborhood. Also
they are more frequently enrolled in upper general or pre-university
education. Whether students required a retake in order to graduate (i.e.
the retake is high stakes) is reflected in the lower achieved SE-grade of
5.74. Even though these students have scored a lower grade on their
school examination, they have otherwise rather similar characteristics
to other retakers, except that upper-general education is relatively over-
represented.
5. Findings
5.1. Performance gains for marginal students in retake exams
The theoretical model predicts that teachers will (primarily) exert
their discretion when the information available and stakes at hand are
both high and if doing so would lead to graduation. In total, 253,796
(22.7%) students make use of their retake opportunity, of which
136,638 (53.8%) are required a retake in order to graduate (i.e. high-
stakes retakers). Fig. 6 shows for high-stakes retakers the final grades
distributions based on only the first attempt (i.e.CE1) and based on the
highest achieved grade achieved in the first attempt and the retake
(i.e.max (CE1, CE2)). Of these high-stakes retakers, 108,972 students
(79.8%) experienced a GPA gain by means of the retake exam and
69,280 students (50.7%) graduate as a result of this GPA gain. The
figure shows a large and significant discontinuity at the passing
threshold of 5.5, indicating that a substantial fraction of students is
transferred from the left to the right of the passing threshold. There are
three reasons that could cause such a transfer:
1. Ability boosting, in that students put in a lot of effort in preparing
for the retake as to improve their performance,
2. Mean reversion, in that students performed relatively low on the
initial attempt (Si< ai),
3. Teacher discretion, in that teachers exert their discretion to award
additional points on the retake exam (Δi>0),
Ability boosting is the process in which students (temporarily) raise
their performance level with the objective to graduate. The optimal
strategy for high-stakes students is to boost their ability and score as
many points as possible on the retake exam, thereby maximizing the
probability of graduating and minimizing the uncertainty with respect
to whether the scored points are indeed enough for graduation. Since
students are able to convert scored points on the retake exam to grades
-as the N-factor is available to them- it can be argued that it is optimal
to achieve only exactly the required number of points needed for gra-
duation, since this maximizes graduation at minimal effort. However,
students do not know how much effort is required and cannot exactly
convert points on the retake exam to grades when the proportion of
open questions is high, which further exemplifies that it is optimal for
students to boost their ability as much as possible and to score as many
points as possible on the retake exam (Fig. 4, Tables B.2 and A1).
Mean reversion departs from the recognition that the grade of a
student is drawn from his/her own (normal) grade distribution, and
when the first attempt produced a grade low in this distribution
(Si< ai), the probability that the retake produces a higher grade than
the grade achieved in the first attempt is relatively high. Mean rever-
sion can be considered a ‘bad test day’-effect and cannot be structurally
related to the proportion open questions on the exam.
Finally, the theoretical model of teacher discretion in grading
(Section 3) shows that teacher manipulation always results in an im-
proved grade (i.e. Δi>0) and is applied only when when it leads to
graduation (i.e. ti>0). Moreover, the model shows that positive grade
manipulation comes at a cost, because exams have a restricted set of
open questions that are subjective to teacher discretion. When all exam
questions consist of multiple choice questions, then there is no set of
points at all that is subjective to teacher discretion. Instead, when there
are many open questions, teachers have a larger set of questions to
exploit their discretion and increase the grade. Thus, when teachers
structurally manipulate exam grades in the retake period, the propor-
tion of open questions of the retake exam should correlate positively
with both grade gains and the propensity to graduate.
Table 1
Comparing characteristics of full population with retakers .
Full Population Retake Population
All High Stakes
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Male 0.50 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.48 0.50
Age on October 1st 16.08 0.96 16.25 1.00 16.37 1.02
Non-Dutch Background 0.20 0.40 0.30 0.46 0.32 0.46
Impoverished Neighborhood 0.13 0.34 0.18 0.39 0.19 0.40
SE 6.52 0.84 6.04 0.86 5.74 0.69
Pre-vocational education 0.55 0.50 0.48 0.52 0.43 0.50
Upper general education 0.26 0.44 0.29 0.45 0.34 0.47
Pre-university education 0.17 0.38 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.43
Missing covariate(s) 0.16 0.37 0.20 0.40 0.22 0.41
POQ 0.68 0.29 0.70 0.30 0.72 0.29
CE1 62.5 11.9 48.8 10.3 45.3 8.38
CE2 – – 55.6 13.4 54.4 13.1
N 1,118,650 253,796 136,638
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Fig. 5 illustrates the relationship between the proportion of open
questions and GPA gains that students achieve by doing a retake exam.
The left panel shows the GPA gains when the proportion of open
questions is less than 20%, while the right panel shows the GPA gains
when the proportion of open questions is more than 80%. Both panels
show that students are transferred to the right of the passing threshold,
but McCrary density tests (McCrary, 2008) show that the observed
discontinuity at the passing threshold (i.e. =GPA 55) is much larger
when the proportion of open questions is larger (i.e. 0.55 versus 0.14).
These results are indicative that the proportion of open questions on
the retake exam can be important in estimating potential teacher dis-
cretion effects when comparing high-stakes retaking students. Yet, be-
fore presenting the results of the proposed estimation strategy ex-
ploiting variation in the proportion open questions on the retake exam,
it is relevant to note that no significant discontinuity is observed (0.02)
for first attempt scores observed in the first attempt but that a dis-
continuity is observed (0.23) for first-attempt scores for the very small
(N = 6,679) and non-random group of students for which a first at-
tempt is observed in the second period (i.e. group B, when the N-factor
is known). Despite the selective nature of this subpopulation, finding
this discrepancy further corroborates the potential existence of teacher
discretion effects. Appendix C elaborates on these findings.
5.2. Teacher discretion effects on student graduation
Based on the aforementioned reasoning, the proportion open ques-
tions (POQ) is used as an instrument for identifying teacher discretion
effects. In Appendix B, it is shown that for the 386 subject-year clusters
considered in the sample of graduating retakers, the proportion of open
questions (Fig. B.1) is negatively skewed (M = 0.72 and SD = 0.28).
Table 2 Model 1 indicates that POQ does not predict first-attempt
performance on the central exam (CE1), thereby supporting its validity
as an instrument to identify teacher discretion effects on the retake
exam (i.e.CE2).
Model 2 in Table 2 considers observed gains on the retake exam (i.e.
Eq. (7)) and shows that the estimated coefficient for POQ now is 3.6
points and highly significant. In order to isolate variation in retake
exam grades resulting from teacher discretion (and not mean reversion
or ability boosting), CE2 is instrumented by proportion open questions
Fig. 4. Grade distributions based on first and retake attempts.
Fig. 5. Grade distributions based on first and second attempt - by exam question openness.
Fig. 6. School-level transferal rate distribution.
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(POQ). Doing so reveals that the instrument does not seem to weak with
an F-statistic of the empty-model first stage of 25.47 and Table B.1
(Appendix B) gives the first stage results of the full model including all
covariates. Model 3 in Table 2 displays the corresponding 2SLS results
for the effect of teacher discretion on graduation for retakers and
confirms that this effect is positive and statistically significant. This
confirms that teachers exploit their discretion to let students graduate
who would otherwise not have graduated.
To get an idea of the number of students this concerns, the observed
central exam improvement gains for the 69,280 individual graduating
retaking students are “corrected” for teacher discretion, using the
proportion of open questions on the retake exam and the 95% con-
fidence interval of the POQ parameter estimate obtained by estimating
the regression equation of Model 2 for this subset of students. The es-
timated coefficient of POQ for theses students is 4.21 with 95% CI
[2.94, 5.47]. Using these simulated lower and upper bounds of per-
formance gains in the case of no teacher discretion, subject-specific
final GPA scores are re-calculated and for each student it is determined
whether or not (s)he would have still passed the pivotal graduating
threshold. The result of simulation exercise returns a range of
7.2–13.7% (with a mean of 11.0 percent). This suggests that approxi-
mately 11% of all students who graduated by means of a retake did so
because of teacher discretion. On a yearly basis, this translates to
roughly 1300 students who are transferred to graduation as a result of a
teacher exerting discretion while grading
5.3. Teacher discretion and unequal graduation opportunities
Notwithstanding that teacher discretion effects can originate from a
genuine desire to help students graduate, it can have undesirable effects
in that it can cause inequitable within- and between-school variation in
graduation opportunities for high-stakes retakers.
With respect to potential concerns of within-school inequity, Table 3
Model 1 again shows the reduced form OLS results for performance
gains, but now also disaggregated by gender and Dutch background.
The subgroup-specific coefficient estimate of the impact of proportion
open questions on performance gains (α1) is then used to simulate how
many graduating high stakes retakings students for each subgroup
would have graduated if no teacher discretion would be present. The
results reveal that relatively more high-stakes retaking girls benefited
from teacher discretion with respect to observed graduation status as
well as students with a Dutch background. These differences are the
joint result of mechanisms operating both at the teacher-and school-
level, which cannot be disentangled as no teacher characteristics are
observed.
These results indicate that teacher discretion effects can result in
unequal graduation opportunities (by school choice) and that these
effects arise because (teachers in) some schools exploit discretion in
grading retake exams more than (teachers in) other schools.
With respect to potential concerns of between-school inequity, the
proportion of high-stakes retakers at a school that graduated due to the
retake exam result -referred to here as the transferal rate- is ex-
ploratively examined. The average transferal rate for the sample of
high-risk retakers is 54.8%. Figure 8 displays the transferal rate by
school location and year and the distribution shows a substantial amount
of variance, indicating that in some schools no high-stakes retakers are
transferred towards graduation in a given year, while in other schools
all high-stakes retakers are transferred towards graduation in that year.
Observing variation around the mean is not necessarily problematic
with respect to between-school inequity, as long as schools are not
structurally located high (or low) in this distribution over time. To
examine whether this is the case, we estimate several random effects
models shown in Table 4. Baseline model 1 shows that the (weighted)
average school-level transferal rate is 58.1% and the intra-class corre-
lation coefficient (ρ) indicates that 65.2% of the observed variation in
transferal rate is due to between school variation. When education level
dummies are included in model 2, the residual intra-class correlation
coefficient becomes lower, but is still 58.6%. It can be argued there may
also be sorting effects of students into schools, in that high-quality
schools attract better students. However, the random effect analysis is
performed only for high-stakes retakers, thus who all required a retake
exam for graduation after taking a nationwide standardized exam. Yet,
to control for potential sorting effects, student controls are added in
model 3, including the school examination grade and the central exam
grade of the first period, and the results show that still 56.4% of the
variation in school-level transferal rate is between school-level varia-
tion. The final model shows that between-school variation is not driven
by structural differences between schools in the proportion of open
questions of retake exams observed across school locations. These re-
sults show that high-stakes retakers are transferred towards graduation
structurally more often in some schools than in others. As such, this
offers a substantial source of between-school inequity in graduation
opportunities for these high-stakes retakers. Importantly, the bottom
row in Table 4 shows the results when estimating the same models for
first attempt scores instead. For this outcome, between school variation
can account for only 2–4% of the total variation instead. The fact that
structural differences between schools emerge only after retakes pro-
vides further suggestive evidence that this phenomenon is due to dif-
ferences in teacher discretion effects.
6. Discussion
This study shows that teachers structurally use their discretion to
increase the performance of their students with the objective to let them
graduate. This discretion is targeted at student who find themselves just
below the passing threshold and effectuated when the stakes are highest
and there is full information on how to convert assigned points to
grades. To distinguish teacher discretion effects from the effects of
Table 2
Exam openness: CE1, performance gains and graduation effects.
Outcome CE1 CE2 - CE1 Graduation
Estimation OLS OLS IV.2SLS
1 2 3
Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE
POQ 0.100 (0.788) 3.593*** (0.845)
CE2 0.027*** (0.005)










N 136698 136698 136553




Note:Robust standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** denote significance at a
10/5/1 percent confidence level.
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ability exploitation and mean reversion we use the proportion of open
questions (summary, essay) as an instrument to identify teacher dis-
cretion effects. The identifying assumption is that the proportion open
questions is unrelated with ability boosting of students (i.e. students
-temporarily- raise their performance level with the objective to grad-
uate) and mean reversion, but can be positively related to teacher
discretion. We find that teacher discretion is revealed when the teacher
has full information regarding the conversion of points obtained to
grades, that the effect is larger in magnitude when students are at risk
of not graduating, and larger when teachers have more discretion when
grading the exam. The results suggest that approximately 11% of all
students who graduated by means of a retake exam did so because of
teacher discretion. This roughly translates to 1300 students in any given
exam year. This result is derived only from teacher discretion at retake
exams and -given that teachers locally grade many more tests (e.g.
school exams)- could therefore be considered to be a lower-bound es-
timate of the overall implications of teacher discretion effects in Dutch
secondary education.
Notwithstanding the good intentions teachers arguably have to ar-
tificially improve the grades of students who are on the margin of
graduation, it may have undesirable inequity effects. First of all, it
Table 3
Exam openness: heterogeneous treatment intensity.
All Boys Girls Dutch non-Dutch
Outcome CE2 - CE1 CE2 - CE1 CE2 - CE1 CE2 - CE1 CE2 - CE1
Estimation OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
1 2 3 4 5
Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE
POQ 3.593*** (0.845) 3.199*** (0.970) 3.293*** (0.970) 3.827*** (0.970) 2.857*** (0.893)
CE1 −0.533*** (0.016) −0.559*** (0.017) −0.559*** (0.017) −0.532*** (0.017) −0.542*** (0.017)
SE 0.277*** (0.016) 0.277*** (0.017) 0.271*** (0.020) 0.287*** (0.020) 0.265*** (0.017)
Constant 25.47*** (2.333) 26.48*** (2.645) 30.54*** (3.124) 23.45** (2.687) 28.46** (2.799)
Student-level controls √ √ √ √ √
Level+ Year dummies √ √ √ √ √
School Location FE √ √ √ √ √
Simulated Graduation Effect 11.0% 10.2% 12.4% 11.2% 9.5%
N 136698 51002 55608 93760 42938
R2 0.241 0.275 0.269 0.223 0.289
# subject-year clusters 389 323 330 330 330
Note:Robust standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** denote significance at a 10/5/1 percent confidence level.
Table 4
Between-school inequity: random-effects model.
Dependent variable: School-level year transferal rate
1 2 3 4
Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE
Constant 0.581*** (0.004) 0.573*** (0.004) 0.534*** (0.009) 0.520*** (0.009)
Education level dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Student controls No No Yes Yes
Exam openness No No No Yes
# students 136,698 136,698 136,698 136,698
# school locations 1,176 1,176 1,176 1,176
sigma_u 0.143 0.125 0.119 0.119
sigma_e 0.105 0.105 0.104 0.104
R2 0.000 0.098 0.070 0.069
ρtransferalrate 0.652 0.586 0.564 0.564
ρfirstattemptscore 0.041 0.040 0.030 0.023
Note: */**/*** denote significance at 10/5/1% level (two-sided). Outcome variable in Models 1–4 is the observed yearly transferal rate for the school location a
student attends. Standard errors are clustered at the subject-year level. Student-level controls are: boy, age, non-Dutch background, impoverished neighborhood, SE-
grade and a dummies for whether a covariate is missing. Education level dummies are: pre-vocational education, upper general education. Exam openness is the
percentage of open questions of the retake exam. School-location random effects are based on 1176 school locations.
Table B.1






Prop. Open Questions (POQ) 3.597*** (0.846)
Constant 25.28*** (2.298)
Student-level controls √
Education Level dummies √
Year dummies √
School Location Fixed Effects √
N 136,553
Adj.R2 0.243
# subject-year clusters 389
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** denote significance at a
10/5/1 percent confidence level. Outcome variable in Models 1–4 is the ob-
served first-attempt CE-grade for a graduating retaker. Standard errors are
clustered at the subject-year level. Student-level controls are: boy, age, non-
Dutch background, impoverished neighborhood, SE-grade and a dummies for
whether a covariate is missing. Education level dummies are: pre-vocational
education, upper general education.
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results in between-subject variation (i.e. the retake subject choice
matters for graduation). Secondly, it can cause both inequitable
between-school variation (i.e. school-location differences in transferal
rates) and within-school variation due to heterogeneity of teacher dis-
cretion effects with respect to student-level characteristics. The struc-
tural differences observed between schools indicate that teacher dis-
cretion effects result in unequal graduation opportunities (by school
choice) and these effects arise because (teachers in) some schools ex-
ploit their discretion more than (teachers in) other schools.
When objective skills-assessment is a priority of the school-leaving
exams, the results presented here show that teacher discretion issues
can -at least in theory- be easily resolved by either avoiding teacher
discretion when grading, or by imposing that the nation-wide central
exams are graded anonymously. Obviously, this can potentially start a
different public debate about whether it is desirable that students who
are just below the passing threshold have to redo the examination year
(either partially or entirely). However, these valid questions are directly
targeted at the functioning of the exam system, and stand alone in the
fundamental argument that students should have equal educational
opportunities.
Appendix A. Graduation rules: Pass-Fail Regulations
For the evaluation window considered in this study, the rules state (REF) that students in pre-vocational education pass the school-leaving
examinations if one of the following situations hold:
1. GPA for all subjects is at least 5.5
2. GPA for one subject is between 4.5 and 5.45, for all other subjects at least 5.5
3. GPA for one subject is between 3.5 and 4.45, for one subject at least 6.5, and for all other subjects at least 5.5
4. GPA for two subjects is between 4.5 and 5.45, for one subject at least 6.5, and for all other subjects at least 5.5
For students who are in secondary general education, and pre-university education these rules are:
1. GPA for all subjects is at least 5.5
2. GPA for one subject is between 4.5 and 5.45, for all other subjects at least 5.5
3. GPA for one subject is between 3.5 and 4.45 and for all other subjects at least 5.5 and overall GPA is at least 6.0 based on subject grades rounded
to whole integers.
4. GPA for two subjects is between 4.5 and 5.45, and for all other subjects at least 5.5 and overall GPA is at least 6.0 based on subject grades rounded
to whole integers.
5. GPA for one subject is between 3.5 and 4.45, for one subject between 4.5 and 5.45, and for all other subjects at least 5.5 and overall GPA is at least
6.0 based on subject grades rounded to whole integers.
For 2012, an additional graduation requirement for students in secondary upper general and pre-university education is that the average CE-
grade across all subjects is at least 5.5.
Table B.2
Validity instrument: Exam openness and CE1 performance.
Outcome CE1 CE1 CE1 CE1
Estimation OLS OLS OLS OLS
1 2 3 4
Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE
POQ −0.295 (0.640) −0.064 (0.741) −0.001 (0.840) 0.100 (0.788)
SE 0.114*** (0.025) 0.115*** (0.028) 0.122*** (0.026)
Constant 44.95*** (0.447) 41.59*** (5.638) 41.15*** (3.116) 41.11*** (2.524)
Student-level controls √ √ √
Level+ Year dummies √ √
School Location FE √
N 136698 136698 136698 136698
R2 0.016 0.036 0.045 0.069
# subject-year clusters 389 389 389 389
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** denote significance at a 10/5/1 percent confidence level.
Table A1
Selective participation in first exam attempt.
First Attempt in
Term 1 Term 2
Mean SD Mean SD
Male 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
Age on October 1st 16.07 0.96 16.18 1.05
Migrant Background 0.20 0.40 0.28 0.45
Impoverished Neighborhood 0.13 0.34 0.18 0.39
SE 6.52 0.84 6.36 0.91
Pre-vocational education 0.55 0.50 0.50 0.50
Upper general education 0.26 0.44 0.29 0.46
Pre-university education 0.19 0.39 0.21 0.41
N 1,111,971 6,679
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Appendix B. Proportion open questions
Appendix C. Teacher discretion effects and selective participation in first exam attempts
For the vast majority of students (N = 1,111,971), the first attempts are observed in the first term (i.e. situation A), when the N-factor required for
points-to-grade conversion is unknown. First attempts in the second term (i.e. situation B) are arguably incidental and random (e.g. sickness), such that
average student characteristics related to exam performance should not correlate with the incidence of observing a first attempt in the second term.
Although this situation indeed occurs for a relatively small group of students (N = 6,679), it is an interesting situation because in term 2 the N-factor is
known to both teachers and students such that exam scores can be precisely converted to a grade. Furthermore, mean reversion cannot confound the
interpretation when comparing first-attempt subject-exam grade distributions across situations A and B. Lastly, we can compare first attempt results for
the same group of students, thereby exploiting variation in whether the N-factor is known (i.e. situation A versus B), variation in stakes at hand (i.e. all
students versus high-stakes retakers), and variation in teacher discretion (i.e. all subjects versus subjects with at least 80% open questions).
Table 3 compares characteristics of students who had their first exam attempt in term 1 with those who had their first attempt in term 2. The table
indicates that sample of students withfirst attempt in term 2 (situation B) are not a random sample of the total student population. Students with a
first attempt in term 2 are, on average, somewhat older, have achieved lower school exam grades, more frequently have a migrant background and
live in an impoverished neighborhood. These differences indicate that a selective group of relatively lower performing students had their first
attempt in term 2.
Fig. A1 then compares the subject-specific GPA distributions of first exam attempts for term 1 and 2 separately. The left panel shows no sizable
discontinuity (i.e. 0.02) at the passing threshold of 55 (the statistical significance is primarily the result of the large number of observations in
Fig. B.1. Cumulative distribution function of proportion open questions.
Fig. A1. Final test score distribution first attempts: term 1 vs term 2.
I. Cornelisz, et al. Economics of Education Review 73 (2019) 101908
11
situation A). This is as expected, since for a first attempt in term 1 it is not possible to convert points to grades and concurrently to target grade
manipulation effectively. Yet, the right panel (situation B) shows a substantial and significant discontinuity at the passing threshold for first attempts
observed in term 2, indicating that a significant proportion of students is transferred from the left to right of the test score distribution. The McCrary
density discontinuity result of 0.23 thus indicates that either teachers use their discretion to enable students to pass the subject (and graduate) in the
first attempt (Δi>0) and/or that students have (temporarily) boosted their ability to pass the subject. To distinguish whether it is the teacher and/or
student creating this difference between situation A and B, the sample is restricted to contain only the high-stakes retaking students (N = 136,638).
Whereas high-stakes retaking students represent roughly 12% (136,638 out of 1,118,650) of the total sample, they make up 15% (1,031 out of 6,679)
of the students observed to have at least one first attempt in term 2. This corroborates the aforementioned selective nature of this group. The reason
they are selected for the results displayed in Figure 7 is that if a subject exam’s first attempt is observed in term 2 for this subsample of students, it by
definition is a high stakes event (i.e. given that they need a retake for graduation, failing this subject for which the first attempt is observed in term 2
will be detrimental for their propensity to graduate).
The upper left McCrary density test results relate to the subject-specific first-attempt GPA distribution observed in term 1 and the observed
negative discontinuity indicates that high-stakes retaker are more frequently (just) failing a particular subject. Yet, when for these students the GPA
distribution is analyzed for the subject(s) for which a first attempt is observed in term 2, a markedly different picture emerges in that now a positive
discontinuity is observed.
This discontinuity is larger than for the overall population of students for which first attempts are observed in term 2 (i.e. 0.35 versus 0.23
overall), which is in line with the high-stakes nature of this subpopulation of students. Furthermore, the bottom panels in Fig. A2 indicate that results
Fig. A2. Final test score distribution of high-stakes retakers’ first attempt: term 1 vs term 2.
I. Cornelisz, et al. Economics of Education Review 73 (2019) 101908
12
for exams with more than 80% open questions are similar to other exams in terms of their first attempt term 1 distributions, but even larger positive
discontinuities are observed when it concerns a first attempt exam observed in term 2 (i.e. 0.59 versus 0.35 overall). While these results only concern
a small subsample of the overall student population, it reaffirms that teachers exploit their discretion to artificially improve performance as to let
students graduate who would otherwise not have graduated. Furthermore, this phenomenon is observed in a context when potential mean reversion
does not come into play, reveals itself when the N-factor is known, is larger in magnitude when students are at risk of not graduating, and larger
when teachers have more discretion when grading the exam.
Supplementary material
Supplementary material associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at 10.1016/j.econedurev.2019.07.002 .
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